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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Carolyn Jaffe Andrew*
Abstractor
Admissions-People v. Rand. 21 Cal. Rptr. 89
(Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Having waived trial by
jury, defendant was convicted by the trial court of
possession of marijuana. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred in admitting an
involuntary statement made by defendant at the
place of his arrest. The District Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that where defendant's admission
that certain marijuana cigarettes were his was made
after police officers threatened to take defendant
and his wife to jail and possibly his children to
"juvenile," the statement was involuntary since it
resulted from improper pressure; that since the
reasons for excluding involuntary confessions apply
equally to all involuntary statements by an accused
relative to the offence charged, defendant's involuntary admission should not have been admitted as evidence; and since it was impossible to
determine how much, if any, weight the trial court
gave to the statement, defendant's conviction must
be reversed. Inasmuch as there was some question
as to whether or not defendant had made timely
objection to admission of the statement, the court
noted that defendant could claim error on appeal
even if he had not made timely objection, "because
to hold otherwise would be to sanction a denial of
due process of law."
Arrest-False Arrest-Ahlarez v. Reynolds, 181
N.E.2d 616 (Ill. App. 1962). Plaintiff sued defendant Chicago police officers for false arrest and
imprisonment, and judgment on a verdict of
$10,000 was entered in his favor. On appeal, defendants contended that since they had reasonable
grounds to arrest plaintiff without a warrant, the
arrest was legal and thus plaintiff could not maintain the action; and that even if the arrest was unlawful, defendants were not liable for damages due
to unlawful detention of plaintiff after they turned
him over to detectives. The Appellate Court of
Illinois reversed and remanded, holding that the
arrest without a warrant for a crime not committed
* Student, Northwestern University School of Law.

in defendants' presence would be lawful only if a
crime in fact had been committed and defendants
had reasonable grounds to believe that plaintiff
had committed it; that where the evidence showed
that one Thomas stated that he had been robbed,
identified a man as one of the robbers, signed a
complaint, and appeared at two arraignment hearings, and where no evidence to the contrary was
offered, the evidence showed that a crime had been
committed; that where evidence as to whether
Thomas was sober, whether he definitely identified plaintiff, and whether plaintiff's location when
seen and arrested was consistent with Thomas'
story, was in dispute, the issue of probable cause
was properly submitted to the jury; but that since
defendants' duties as police officers ceased when
they turned plaintiff over to the investigating
detectives, instructions as to statutory provisions
relating to defendants' duty to bring plaintiff before a judge were erroneous, inasmuch as defendants could not be held liable for acts committed
by those to whom they properly delivered plaintiff, even on the theory that the detectives' acts
constituted a foreseeable consequence of the arrest.
Arrest-Road Blocks-Commnwealth v. Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1962). Defendant
was charged with driving a motor vehicle without
an operator's license. On appeal by the Commonwealth from the Quarterly Court's dismissal of the
charge, the Circuit Court affirmed. On certification
of the law by request of the attorney general, defendant contended that her arrest, which resulted
from a road block set up for the purpose of requiring drivers to display operators' licenses, was unconstitutional, and consequently evidence that
defendant did not have a license should be suppressed on the basis that it arose out of the illegal
road block. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky
certified the law, holding that since the purpose of
the road block was to ascertain whether there were
violations of the law requiring every motorist to
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have an operator's license in his possession while
driving, and since driving is a privilege subject to
reasonable regulation by the Commonwealth, the
road block was a proper exercise of police power in
the enforcement of a statute designed to promote
public welfare and safety; and consequently defendant's arrest was lawful and the evidence was
admissible. The court noted that the case did not
concern admissibility of evidence of other offenses
resulting from the search of a vehicle intercepted
for the purpose of examining the license of the
driver, and that the decision did not sanction a
stopping of cars actuated by motives not related
to the licensing requirement.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Peoplev. McLaine,
22 Cal. Rptr. 72 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Defendant
was convicted of first degree robbery. On appeal
from the judgment and from an order denying his
motion for new trial, defendant contended that
since police officers had illegally stopped his car
and illegally arrested him, evidence obtained as a
consequence of the arrest should not have been
admitted against him. The District Court of
Appeal affirmed, holding that a standard less strict
than that of probable cause is required to justify
interrogation of a person outdoors at night; that
this standard is that the circumstances be such as
would indicate to a reasonable police officer that
interrogation is necessary in the discharge of his
duties; that this right to interrogate includes the
right to stop the automobile in which the person to
be interrogated happens to be riding, and such
stopping and interrogating does not constitute an
arrest; that since the officers had received a report
of a robbery nearby, including a description of the
participants, and since one of the occupants of the
car in which defendant was riding repeatedly
turned around in apparent observation of the police
car, the officers had enough information to satisfy
the standard required to warrant stopping the
automobile for the purpose of interrogating its
occupants; that since the gun taken from the car
was in plain sight once the car was lawfully
stopped, it was not seized as the result of a search;
and that discovery of the gun, in conjunction with
the aforementioned circumstances, constituted
probable cause to arrest defendant.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People v. Walker,
21 Cal. Rptr. 692 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Defendant
was convicted of possession of marijuana. On appeal, defendant contended that he was illegally
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arrested and that the marijuana cigarette used as
evidence against him was obtained as a direct result of the arrest. The District Court of Appeal
affirmed, holding that although defendant's arrest
without a warrant for misdemeanors relating to
driving committed outside the arresting officer's
presence was illegal, since an arrest without a
warrant for a misdemeanor is lawful only if the
misdemeanor is committed in the presence of the
arresting officer, the seizure of the marijuana was
lawful and was not a product of defendant's illegal
arrest, inasmuch as the cigarette was discovered
when defendant, at the county hospital for a blood
alcohol test, removed it from his pocket voluntarily; and that since the arresting officer had
reasonable cause [type of cigarette, defendant's
apparent intoxication, and his denial of intoxication] to believe that the cigarette contained marijuana, i.e., that an offense was being committed
in his presence, the cigarette was lawfully seized
and thus was properly admitted as evidence at the
trial.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People v. Symons,
20 Cal. Rptr. 400 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Defendant
was convicted, as a third offender, of illegal possession of heroin. On appeal, defendant contended
that a jar of heroin obtained as the result of an
illegal search should not have been admitted into
evidence. The District Court of Appeal affirmed,
holding that when, during surveillance of defendant's home, the arresting officer without
means of sound amplifying devices repeatedly
overheard conversations in the jargon of narcotics
addicts concerning the obtaining and using of
heroin, and once through a window observed someone heating a spoon with a match, he had probable
cause to arrest defendant without a warrant, since
the applicable standard justifying arrest without a
warrant was not whether a reasonable ordinary
man, knowing what the officer knew, would have
probable cause to believe defendant was committing a felony, but whether a reasonable, experienced narcotics division officer, knowing what the
officer knew, would have such probable cause; that
since the arrest was lawful, the fact that the arresting officer had ample time to secure a warrant was
immaterial; and even though the search preceded
the valid arrest, it was lawful as incident thereto.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People v. Baranko,
20 Cal. Rptr. 139 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Defendant
was convicted of bookmakiig. On appeal, de-
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fendant contended that his arrest and that of a
co-defendant were unlawful for lack of probable
cause, and that evidence seized during a search incident to the arrests should not have been admitted. The District Court of Appeal affirmed,
holding that where the arresting officer had reliable information from a fellow officer that bookmaking activities were being conducted upon certain premises, that defendant had left his home,
bought a scratch sheet, and gone to those premises
on three separate occasions, and that the fellow
officer had discovered betting markers in defendant's handwriting behind the premises, and
where the arresting officer, who had a police photograph of defendant, had personally observed him
go to these premises, he had probable cause to believe that defendant was on the premises and was
there committing the felony of bookmaking, and
thus lawfully entered the premises and arrested
defendant without a warrant;- that the ensuing
search and seizure of bookmaking paraphernalia
was lawful as incident to the valid arrest; and that
even if there was no probable cause to arrest the
co-defendant, this would not taint the lawful
character of defendant's arrest and the subsequent
search and seizure.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Matthews v. State,
179 A.2d 892 (Md. 1962). Defendant was convicted of keeping a disorderly house. On appeal,
defendant contended that his arrest without a
warrant and the search incident thereto were
illegal. The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed,
holding that when a police officer and policewoman
were assigned a room in a house leased by defendant without inquiry as to their marital status
and without being asked to register, they had
probable cause to believe that the misdemeanor of
keeping a disorderly house was being committed in
their presence; that when defendant admitted the
premises were under his control, the officers
arrested him lawfully without a warrant; and that
the search of the premises was lawful as incident to
the valid arrest.
Burden of Proof-State v. Adams, 355 S.W.2d
21 (Mo. 1962). See Insanity, infra.
Civil Rights Act-Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24
(9th Cir. 1962). Plaintiff sued defendant Los
Angeles police officers under a provision of the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1958), for damages
caused by alleged unreasonable searches and

seizures in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process of law. On appeal from the
District Court's dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, Plaintiff contended that an
allegation that the unauthorized acts, committed
under color of state authority, which deprived him
of a constitutional right, were committed for the
purpose of discriminating between persons or
classes of persons or for the purpose of depriving
plaintiff of any federal right, was not necessary for
the statement of a claim under §1983. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that under its reading of Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), abstracted at 52
J. CRnr. L., C. & P.S. 593 (1961), no allegation of
specific intent is necessary to support a claim,
based on violation of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, for damages under the
Civil Rights Act..The court noted that cases holding otherwise concerned either criminal penalties or
claims predicated on violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection clause.
Comment on Failure to Testify-Bisno v. United
States, 299 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1962). See HusbandWife Privilege, infra.
Confessions-Gallegos v. Colorado, 82 Sup. Ct.
1209 (1962). Petitioner was convicted of first degree
murder, and the Supreme Court of Colorado
affirmed. On certiorari, petitioner contended that a
coerced confession constituted the crucial evidence
against him. In a four to three decision, the United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that where
petitioner, aged 14, was confined for five days
without being allowed to see his parents and without advice of counsel or any friendly adult advisor
before making a formal confession, the totality of
the circumstances showed that the confession was
obtained in violation of due process, and hence
petitioner's conviction, which may have rested
upon the formal confession, must be reversed. The
Court reached this result even though petitioner
had informally confessed to a police officer on the
day after his arrest, noting that petitioner was then
unaware of his constitutional rights due to his immaturity and lack of adult advice.
. Confessions-United States ex rel. Noja v. Fay,
300 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1962). See Habeas Corpus,
infra.
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Confessions-Kasinger v. State, 354 S.W.2d
718 (Ark. 1962). Defendants were convicted of
burglary. On appeal, the defendants, who were
youths in their late teens, contended that they were
convicted on the basis of involuntary confessions.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed and
remanded, holding that where defendants were
arrested without amarrant, were confined for three
days in a cold cell with inadequate cover before
they confessed, were without counsel, did not see
their parents, observed the condition of the face of
a co-defendant who had been beaten and were told
he had been beaten by one of the officers, saw blood
in the co-defendant's cell, and were threatened with
the same treatment received by the co-defendant
if they did not confess, the jury should not have
been permitted to consider the confessions; and
that although the coercive facts described above
had no effect on the earlier confession of one of the
defendants, his conviction must also be reversed,
since his second confession, procured under the
stated conditions, was not voluntary and may have
contributed to his conviction. The court pointed
out that its holding was not that the confessions
were involuntary, but rather that their voluntariness was not established.
Confessions-People v. Wright, 180 N.E.2d 689
(Ill. 1962). Defendant was convicted of burglary
and rape. On writ of error, defendant contended
that an involuntary confession had been admitted
against him. The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed and remanded, holding that where defendant testified that physical harm and threats of
further physical harm had been used by police
officers to coerce him to confess, and -the State
failed to call or explain the absence of three police
officers who were present during the alleged chain
of coercion, the State had failed to satisfy its
burden of proving the voluntariness of defendant's
confession, since this burden is discharged only
when all material witnesses connected with the
challenged confession are produced, including those
absent at the actual time of confession but present
when the alleged illegal conduct took place; and
since the voluntariness of defendant's confession
was not established, it should not have been admitted at the trial.
Cruel and Unusual Punishment-Robinson v.
California,82 Sup. Ct. 1417 (1962). Defendant was
convicted of being a narcotics addict, and the
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judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Department of the Los Angeles County Superior Court
(the highest state court to which defendant could
take his case). On appeal, defendant contended
that the statute under which he was convicted was
unconstitutional because it made a crime of the
status of being a narcotics addict. The United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
California statute [CAL. HEALTH & S~sETY CODE
§11721], which made it a criminal offense to be a
drug addict, was unconstitutional as inflicting a
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, since the characterization
of drug addiction as an illness compels that no one
be criminally punished for having such status.
The Court noted that while compulsory treatment
for drug addicts would not offend due process, the
statute involved criminal sanctions only with no
pretense at' treatment. The concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Douglas contains many references to
authorities which treat drug addiction as an illness,
and compares recent developments in attitudes
toward drug addiction with those concerning insanity.
Derivative Evidence-United States v. Paroutian,
299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962). See Search and Seizure, infra.
Derivative Evidence-People v. Walker, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 692 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). See Arrest, Search
and Seizure, supra.

Double Jeopardy-Downum v. United States,
300 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1962). Defendant was convicted of stealing, forging, and passing government
checks, and of conspiracy to commit these acts. On
appeal, defendant contended that the trial court
erred in proceeding with the trial over his plea of
former jeopardy, since he had been placed in
jeopardy for the same offenses by a former trial
at which the jury was discharged because of the
absence of a material prosecution witness. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
holding that where the jury at the former trial had
been impaneled and sworn but no evidence had
been offered or heard, defendant was not then
placed in jeopardy so as to bar his subsequent
trial, inasmuch as defendant was not prejudiced
in any way by being tried two days after the
former trial, and since the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by discharging the jury in
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the public interest in light of the fact that the
former trial could not proceed without the missing
witness.
Double Jeopardy-Seiterlev. Superior Court, 20
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1962). Defendant pleaded guilty to
two counts of murder, two counts of kidnaping
for purposes of robbery with bodily harm, and
conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree,
and in a jury trial on the sole issue of penalty
was sentened to death on the murder charges and
to life imprisonment for each of the other offenses.
The Supreme Court of California reversed the
judgment as to the death sentences because of
prejudicial error committed by the trial court, and
affirmed the judgment as modified by adding the
words "without possibility of parole" to that
portion of the judgment sentencing defendant to
life imprisonment. On application for writ of
prohibition to restrain respondent court from
retrying the issue of penalty on the murder counts,
defendant contended that since he had been
convicted and sentenced of kidnaping, CAL. PEN.
CODE §654 [providing in part that an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under one of several
provisions making a single act punishable bars a
prosecution for the same act under another applicable provision] barred further prosecution, i.e.,
retrial on the issue of penalty, of the murder
charges, which involved the killing of the kidnap
victims. The Supreme Court of California denied
the writ, holding that since the offenses were not
incident to a single intent or objective of defendant
and since the record did not compel the conclusion
that the murders represented the culmination of an
indivisable transaction, §654 was not properly
applicable and respondent court could proceed.
Double Jeopardy-Atkinson v. Parsekian, 179
A.2d 732 (N.J. 1962). The Acting Director of New
Jersey's Division of Motor Vehicles suspended for
one year the licenses of two drivers after each had
been involved in a fatal automobile accident.
Defendant drivers' consolidated appeals to the
Appellate Division of the Superior Court were
certified to the Supreme Court on its own motion.
Defendants contended that since one had been
acquitted and one convicted of criminal charges
arising out of the same accidents as those for
which their respective licenses were subsequently
suspended, the suspension proceedings before the
Acting Director subjected them to double jeop-

ardy. The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed,
holding that since the proceedings before the
Acting Director were designed to promote safety
on the highway rather than to impose criminal
punishment, they were administrative rather than
criminal or quasi-criminal; and therefore defendants' rights against double jeopardy were not
violated, inasmuch as the double jeopardy clause
prohibits only successive criminal punishments for
the same offense.
Due Process of Law-Beck v. Washington, 82
Sup. Ct. 955 (1962). See Prejucidial Publicity,
infra.
Electronic Eavesdropping-Lanza v. New York,
82 Sup. Ct. 1218 (1962). Petitioner's conviction
for refusing to answer questions before a state
legislative committee was affirmed by the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court, and
affirmed as modified by the New York Court of
Appeals. On certiorari, petitioner contended that
the state electronically intercepted and transcribed
a conversation in jail between petitioner and his
brother without their knowledge in violation of
petitioner's due process rights against unreasonable
search and seizure, and consequently New York
denied him due process by convicting him for
failure to answer questions based on that conversation. The United States Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that although surreptitious electronic
eavesdropping under certain circumstances may
amount to an unreasonable search and seizure,
interception of the conversation between petitioner
and his brother, who was then in jail, did not
violate the Fourth Amendment as applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
inasmuch as a jail, with its necessary tradition of
official surveillance, is not a constitutionally
protected place. The majority noted that its
judgment could rest on the fact that petitioner's
refusal to answer questions unrelated to the
intercepted conversation supported the New York
judgment as modified. In two separate opinions,
Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and
Douglas stated that the majority had thus decided
a constitutional question not properly before the
Court, and challenged the correctness of its
decision of that issue.
Equal Protection of the Laws-Beck v. Washing-
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ton, 82 Sup. Ct. 955 (1962). See Prejudicial
Publicity, infra.
Extrajudicial Evidence-People v. Wallenberg,
181 N.E.2d 143 (I-1. 1962). Having waived his
right to trial by jury, defendant was convicted of
robbery by the trial court. On writ of error,
defendant contended that the trial court considered
matters not properly in the record to rebut his
alibi defense. The Supreme Court of Illinois
reversed and remanded, holding that where
defendant's alibi was that at the time of the
robbery he was on a street corner in Chicago 79
blocks from the tavern where the robbery occurred
and that he had proceeded for some distance before
stopping after his tire became soft because there
were no available gas stations along the route on
which he was travelling, and where during pronouncement of the guilty verdict the trial court
commented, "[Defendant] told me there were no
gas stations .. . I happen to know different. I
don't believe his story," the trial court's determination that defendant's alibi was false constituted a denial of due process of law, since due to
a lack of any evidence in the record to rebut the
alibi, the determination was based upon the
court's private knowledge and thus was untested
by cross-examination or the rules of evidence; and
that although it is presumed that a trial court as
trier of fact considers only admissible evidence,
the trial court's statement quoted above, incorporated in the record, rebutted this presumption.
Federal Communications Act-United States v.
Fgdler, 202 F. Supp. 356 (N.D. Cal. 1962). Defendant moved to dismiss an information charging
him with violations of the Federal Communications
Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §605 (1958). Defendant
contended that §605, making punishable the
interception and divulgence or publication, to any
person by any unauthorized person, of any wire or
radio communication, was not applicable to a
newsgathering agency which intercepted and
divulged to a radio station newsworthy portions of
police short wave broadcasts. The District Court
denied the motion, holding that the First Amendment did not prohibit application of §605 to a
newsgathering agency, since freedom of the press
is not absolute; that a provision in the Federal
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §154(o) (1958),
which deals with securing maximum effectiveness
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from public safety radio services, indicated that
Congress intended that such services, which include
police radio broadcasts, be protected by §605
from interception and divulgence by any unauthorized person', including the press; and that
the pre-trial motion proceeding was not the
proper time at which to determine whether the
intercepted broadcasts were made for the use of
the general public, since there was no evidence on
the issue at this stage of the proceedings. [The last
clause of §605 provides that the section does not
apply to communications made for the use of the
general public.]
Freedom of Speech-Wood v.Georgia, 82 Sup.
Ct. 1364 (1962). Petitioner was convicted on
three counts of contempt. After the Georgia
Court of Appeals affirmed two counts and reversed
the third, the Georgia Supreme Court declined to
review the convictions. On certiorari, petitioner
contended that use of the contempt power to
punish his out-of-court statements, which were
published in a newspaper of general. circulation,
violated his right to freedom of speech. The United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
statements by petitioner, a county sheriff, criticizing the judge presiding at a grand jury hearing on
possible election frauds on the ground that his
charge to the grand jury constituted a political attempt to intimidate negroes, could not
constitutionally be punished as contempt of
court, since upon independent scrutiny of the evidence, the Court found that under the circumstances the statements did not present a danger
to the administration of justice so clear and present as to vitiatepetitioner's constitutional right to
freedom of expression.
Habeas Corpus-United States ex rel. Noia v.
Fay, 300 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1962). Petitioner was
convicted of felony murder in a New York state
court in 1942. On appeal from the District Court's
denial of his application for writ of habeas corpus,
petitioner contended that he had been convicted
solely on the basis of a coerced confession. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed
and remanded to the District Court with instructions to issue the writ and to order that petitioner's
conviction be set aside and that he be discharged
from custody unless retried forthwith by New
York, holding that since exceptional circumstances
existed which made it obvious without detailed
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was a felony in the state where it occured, it
would have amounted only to a misdemeanor had
it been committed in Missouri, and hence the
habitual criminal act was improperly applied. The
Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and remanded,
holding that the statute [Mo. REv. STAT. §§556.280
and 556.290 (1959)] could be invoked on the
basis of an out-of-state conviction only if the
offense would be punishable in Missouri by
"imprisonment in the penitentiary," i.e., would be
a felony if committed in Missouri; and that since
defendant was improperly sentenced his conviction
would be reversed and remanded for proper
sentencing, even though the habitual criminal
sentence was shorter than the maximum sentence
which could have been imposed without the enhanced punishment, inasmuch as when the habitual
criminal act is not applicable the jury, not the
Habitual Criminal Acts-Reynolds v. Cochran, judge, determines punishment, and defendant
138 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1962). After completing a was entitled to have a jury, rather than the
sentence for grand larceny and being discharged trial court, fix the penalty.
from custody, petitioner was convicted of being a
Husband-Wife Privilege-Bisno v. United
second offender on the basis of the grand larceny
conviction and a prior felony conviction. On States, 299 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1962). Defendant
petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner was convicted of knowingly and fraudulently
contended that since he had completed all lawful concealing from a trustee in bankruptcy property
sentences imposed against him before being pro- belonging to a bankrupt estate. On appeal, defenceeded against as an habitual criminal, the second ant contended that the trial court erred in refusing
offender sentence was null and void. The Supreme to give an instruction that the jury should draw no
Court of Florida discharged petitioner from inferences against defendant from his failure to
custody, holding that since the habitual criminal call his wife to testify. The Court of Appeals for
act [FLA. STAT. §§775.09 and 775.11 (1959)] the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that where
prescribes a longer sentence for second or subse- defendant's wife's testimony was reasonably
quent offenses and does not make it a crime to expected to have been favorable to defendant,
have been convicted more than once, and since and where the government had no right to call her
the enhanced punishment provided by the act is as a witness over defendant's objection, defendant
an incident to only the last offense, petitioner, who had it peculiarly within his power to produce his
wife; that defendant's failure to call her under
had fully satisfied the judgment imposed against
him pursuant to conviction for his last offense, the circumstances was proper subject for comment
could not be sentenced to enhanced punishment. by the government; that while defendant's wife,
The court indicated that a contrary result might if called by either party, could have exercised her
well lead to a finding that the habitual criminal privilege not to testify, defendant could not rely
on a privilege personal to his wife in order to
act violates constitutional guarantees against
defeat adverse comment by the government; and
double jeopardy.
consequently the trial court's refusal to give the
Habitual Criminal Acts-State v. Kiddoo, 354 requested instruction was not error.
S.W.2d 883 (Mo. 1962). Defendant was convicted
Improper Remarks by Trial Judge-People v.
by a jury of attempted burglary and sentenced by
the trial court as an habitual criminal. On appeal, Lewerenz, 181 N.E.2d 99 (fll. 1962). Defendant
defendant contended that although the prior was convicted of conspiracy to violate narcotics
conviction relied on by Missouri in invoking the laws and of substantive offenses. On writ of error,
enhanced punishment of the habitual criminal act defendant contended that there was no evidence to

inquiry that petitioner had been deprived of the
substantial federal right not to be convicted by
means of a coerced confession, the fact that
petitioner had failed to utilize a state remedy
which once was available to him would not preclude
the federal courts from vindicating his federal
rights by use of habeas corpus. [The circumstances
were that petitioner's two co-defendants who,
unlike petitioner, had exhausted their state
remedies, were free, because their confessions,
obtained under the same conditions as that of
petitioner, were found to be coerced.] The opinion
of the court, written by Judge Waterman, contains
a thorough analysis of the federal writ of habeas
corpus, including detailed treatment of the
"adequate, independent non-federal ground"
concept.
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sustain the conspiracy convictions, and that
remarks of the trial judge in the presence of the
jury were so prejudicial that defendant was
denied a fair trial. The Supreme Court of Illinois
reversed the conspiracy judgments on confession
by the People that they were not sustained by any
evidence, and reversed and remanded as to the
substantive offenses, holding that where on
sixteen occasions during trial the trial judge
characterized as "speeches" defense counsel's
efforts in making normal and brief objections to
evidence, ruled that "the speech is stricken," and
in some instances admonished counsel not to
"make any speeches to me before the jury," the
trial judge's constant disparagement of counsel for
his conscientious effort to fulfill his duties as an
advocate was inconsistent with the court's duty to
uphold defendant's right to a fair trial; and in
light of the fact that jurors place great reliance
on the trial court, the judge's remarks conveyed
an impression to the jury which constituted
prejudicial error.
Insanity-Lynch v. Overholser, 82 Sup. Ct. 1063
(1962). Although petitioner did not plead insanity,
he was found not guilty by reason of insanity of
cashing checks with knowledge that he had
insufficient funds, and was committed to St.
Elizabeths Hospital under the District of Columbia's compulsory commitment statute, D.C. CODE
ANN. §24-301(d) (1961). The District Court
ordered petitioner's release and issued a writ of
habeas corpus, but the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed the judgment. On certiorari, petitioner contended that
the compulsory commitment statute was unconstitutional since it authorized the commitment of
one found not guilty by reason of insanity even if
he protested that he was presently sane and that
his crime was not the product of a mental illness.
The United States Supreme Court reversed and
remanded, holding that the statute was not
applicable to persons such as the petitioner, who
had not pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity,
since the statute must be so construed in light of
the District of Columbia policy [to allay fears as
to possible inroads upon public safety due to the
Durham rule] responsible for its enactment and
because of the rule that a statute should be
construed so as to free it from substantial constitutional doubts. [The question whether one
who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity but
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asserts his present sanity may constitutionally be
committed under the statute remains as yet
unanswered by the Court.]
Insanity-State v. Adams, 355 S.W.2d 21
(Mo. 1962). Defendant was convicted of first
degree murder. On appeal, defendant contended
that an instruction that the jurors must find that
insanity was "established to [their] reasonable
satisfaction" before they could acquit on that
ground was prejudicially erroneous. The Supreme
Court of Missouri reversed and remanded, holding
that an insanity defense must be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence, rather than to the
jury's satisfaction; and although two other instructions properly stated the law and burden of proof
of insanity, defendant's conviction must be
reversed, since the instruction containing an
erroneous standard constituted an affirmative
misdirection and was not cured by the others which
set out the proper standard.
Juries-People v. Kangas, 113 N.W.2d 865
(Mich. 1962). Defendant was convicted of manslaughter. On appeal from the trial "court's denial
of his motion for new trial, defendant contended
that the trial court erred in authorizing instructions
to the jury through a sheriff, after the jury had
requested instructions of the sheriff in jury chambers during the course of deliberation. The Supreme
Court of Michigan reversed and granted a new
trial, holding that in order to keep trials free from
all opportunity for jury tampering and to preserve the privacy and confidence of the jury
during deliberation, the rule is that all jury
instructions must be given in open court; and
since this rule was not followed at defendant's
trial, a new trial must be granted, even though
there was no evidence that the communication
was prompted by improper motives or that it had
influenced the jury.
Juries-Matthews v. State, 139 So. 2d 386
(Miss. 1962). Defendant was convicted of manslaughter. On appeal, defendant contended that the
trial court interrupted the jurors and hurried them
in their deliberations to the prejudice of defendant. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed,
holding that the trial court's inquiry of the jury as
to whether or not it had reached a verdict forty
minutes after it had retired and again thirty
minutes later was not error, since the length of
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time a jury will be kept deliberating is a matter
for judicial discretion, and the fact that the verdict
was not brought in until thirty minutes after the
last inquiry tended to show that this discretion
was not abused so as to prejudice defendant.
Juvenile Proceedings-Dora v. Cochran, 138 So.
2d 508 (Fla. 1962). Petitioner was convicted of
armed robbery. On petition for writ of habeas
corpus, petitioner contended that since he was a
minor at the time of conviction, the judgment
and sentence were void for failure of the State to
give notice to his parents as required by FLA.
STAT. §932.38 (1959). The Supreme Court of
Florida set aside the robbery judgment, discharging petitioner from further detention thereunder,
but remanded him to custody for service of a
sentence for escape, of which petitioner was
convicted after attaining majority, holding that
emancipation of the then minor petitioner by
virtue of his enlistment in military service did not
remove him from the protection of the statute
providing for notice to the parents of "any minor,
not married ... charged with any offense and
brought before any of the courts.. .. "
Narcotics-Robinson v. California, 82 Sup. Ct.
1417 (1962). See Cruel and Unusual Punishment,
supra.
Narcotics-People v. Lott, 181 N.E.2d 112 (Ill.
1962). Defendant was convicted of selling, possessing and dispensing a narcotic drug. On appeal,
defendant contended that mature portions of the
cannabis plant, commonly called marijuana, did
not constitute a narcotic drug under the Uniform
Narcotic Drug Act. The Supreme Court of Illinois
reversed, holding that under ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
38, §192.28-2.17 (1959), mature stalks of the
cannabis plant without the presence of resin did
not fall within the definition of a narcotic drug; and
that defendant satisfied his burden of bringing
himself within the statutory exception when a
Chicago Crime Detection Laboratory chemist,
without referring to the presence of resin, testified
on cross-examination that he tested the cigarettes
sold by defendant to Chicago police officers and
determined that they were composed of mature
portions of the cannabis plant.
National Firearms Act-United States v. Thompson, 202 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Cal. 1961). Defendants

were indicted for illegal possession of an unregistered firearm in violation of the National Firearms
Act of 1934, 26 U.S.C. §5841 (1958). Moving to
dismiss the indictment on the ground that it
failed to charge an offense, defendants contended
that a sawed-off shotgun without a firing pin did
not constitute a firearm within the purview of the
act. The District Court dismissed the indictment,
holding that in light of a stipulation that no firing
pin was found on or about defendants when they
were arrested, the shotgun was temporarily
inoperative and could not have been immediately
put into operating condition; and consequently
since the shotgun as defendants possessed it
could not have propelled a shot through explosive
energy, it was not a firearm covered by the
National Firearms Act. In reaching this conclusion,
the court noted that the Federal Firearms Act,
15 U.S.C. §901 (19"8) covers parts of weapons
which, when whole, are within the scope of the
National Firearms Act, and that the legislative
history of the National Firearms Act indicated
that its coverage was intended to differ from
that of the Federal Firearms Act.
Prejudicial Publicity-Beck v. Washington, 82
Sup. Ct. 955 (1962). The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed petitioner's conviction of grand
larceny. On certiorari, petitioner contended that
since adverse publicity made it impossible for the
grand jury which indicted him and the petit jury
which convicted him to be impartial and unbiased,
his motions for change of venue and for continuances were improperly denied and his conviction
was invalid under the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Speaking through Mr. Justice Clark, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that even
if due process required a state which chose to use
grand jury procedure to furnish an unbiased
grand jury, petitioner failed to prove that the
grand jury which indicted him was prejudiced
against him; that since during the five months
after indictment and before trial the amount and
adverse character of the local publicity concerning
petitioner lessened considerably, and since his
failure to challenge any of the petit jurors for
cause on ground of bias indicated his belief that
they were not biased, the trial court was not
compelled to disbelieve the jurors statements
'that they would be fair and impartial or td find
bias as a matter of law; and consequently the

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES

trial court's rulings on petitioner's motions were
correct, and his conviction did not offend the
Fourteenth Amendment. In an opinion with which
Chief Justice Warren concurred, Mr. Justice Black
dissented, stating that whether or not federal due
process requires states using grand juries to
provide impartial grand juries, in light of the
amount of hostile publicity before and during
the grand jury hearing, failure of the presiding
judge to take precautions required by state
statute to insure that petitioner not be indicted
by a prejudiced grand jury rendered the grand
jury proceedings unconstitutional under the equal
protection clause, even though there was no proof
that any particular grand juror was actually
prejudiced. [The majority refused to deal with the
equal protection issue due to petitioner's failure
to include it in his petition for certiorari.] Mr.
Justice Douglas dissented, stating that due process
required states which use grand juries to provide
impartial ones, and finding that the procedure for
selecting and instructing the grand jury which
indicted petitioner was not fair in light of the
prejudicial publicity.
Prejudicial Publicity-Unied States v. Accardo,
298 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962). Defendant was
convicted of making false income tax return
statements in violation of §7206(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. On appeal, defendant
contended that in light of prejudicial newspaper
publicity which appeared after jury selection had
begun and subsequently during the trial, the trial
court's failure to grant his motions to poll the jury
and for mistrial rendered the trial unfair. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed
and remanded, holding that the published material
would have been inadmissible in evidence because
of its prejudicial nature, and its effect would be no
less harmful to defendant if it reached the jury
through news accounts rather than in court; that
the trial court's general admonitions and cautionary instructions to the jury at the beginning of
jury selection, his assumption that they effectively
prevented the jurors from reading or listening to
news accounts of the trial, and his general inquiry
of the jurors, as a group, as to whether or not
they had followed his instructions failed to protect
adequately defendant's constitutional right to a
fair trial by an impartial jury; and that since
defendant's publicity value was extremely great
and since the jury separated each night, thus
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being exposed to the publicity, the trial court's
denial of defendant's motions, which were designed
to prevent conviction by prejudiced jurors,
amounted to an abuse of discretion. In the opinion
of the court, Judge Kiley recommended that
cautionary instructions regarding the specific
possibility of news accounts about the case be
given prior to daily separation, and that upon
publication of prejudicial news stories during a
trial, the trial judge question each juror individually, out of the presence of the others, as to
whether he had read the articles and their effect
upon him. Judge Schnackenberg dissented, stating
that in absence of proof that any of the jurors
were, in fact, prejudiced, the jury's verdict should
not be overturned by the mere opportunity for
prejudice.
Promises of Leniency-State v. Hingle, 139 So.
2d 205 (La. 1962). While serving a two and onehalf year sentence for attempted possession of
marijuana, defendant was sentenced to twenty
years at hard labor as an habitual criminal. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Louisiana annulled
and remanded for proper imposition of the twenty
year sentence. On rehearing, defendant contended
that since he pleaded guilty to the offense of
attempted possession in reliance on a promise by
the prosecutor that he would not file habitual
criminal charges against defendant, the agreement
operated as a bar to the subsequent proceedings.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana set aside the
habitual criminal conviction and sentence and
ordered that defendant complete service of the
sentence for attempted possession, holding that
where the agreement was made with the consent
and approval of the trial judge, it effectively
barred sentencing defendant as an habitual
criminal, since to hold otherwise would allow
prosecutors to repudiate bargains made with
persons accused of crime who, in good faith,
relinquish fundamental rights in reliance on such
bargains, which would be inconsistent with the
pledge of the State's public faith placed in these
officers. The court indicated that this reasoning
would compel the same result even if the agreement were not made with the approval of the
trial judge.
Public Welfare Offenses-State v. Kremer, 114
N.W.2d 88 (Minn. 1962). Defendant was convicted
of driving through a red flashing light in violation
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of a city ordinance. On appeal, defendant contended that since the trial court found that he was
unable to stop because of brake failure, that he had
experienced no prior brake trouble, and that he
had no knowledge of the defective condition of his
brakes, the evidence did not sustain his conviction.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed,
holding that when an act is deemed a crime
without regard to criminal intent, the wrongdoer
must intend to commit the act in order that his
conduct be criminal; and that since defendant was
unable to stop at the flashing red light because of
defective brakes and was not negligent for failure
to know of the defect, he did not intend to proceed
through the intersection without stopping and
thus did not intend to commit the act which
constituted the crime.
Right to Counsel-Carnley v. Cochran, 82 Sup.
Ct. 884 (1962). Petitioner was convicted of violating Florida's Child Molester Act, and the
Florida Supreme Court denied his application
for writ of habeas corpus. On certiorari, petitioner
contended that he was not afforded the assistance
of counsel and hence was deprived of a right
guaranteed him by the Fourteenth Amendment.
In an opinion written by Mr. Justice Brennan,
the United States Supreme Court reversed and
remanded, holding that where petitioner was
illiterate, the trial court made efforts to assist
petitioner but did not fully apprise him of vital
procedural rights which laymen could not be
expected to know, and counsel would have materially assisted petitioner by invoking special
psychiatric and rehabilitory provisions of the law
under which he was convicted, petitioner's case
was one in which the assistance of counsel, if not
waived, was guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment; and that since petitioner did not
plead guilty and the record was silent as to waiver,
petitioner could not be deemed to have waived his
right to counsel, since anything less than a showing
that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer is
not waiver. Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in the
result. Concurring opinions written by Mr. Justice
Black (joined by Chief Justice Warren and Mr.
Justice Douglas) and Mr. Justice Douglas set
forth the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel in a state criminal trial
ought not to be limited in non-capital cases to
those cases in which denial of counsel renders

the trial fundamentally unfair, and advocated that
Belts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), be overruled
in order that the Fourteenth Amendment right
to counsel in state criminal cases be made coextensive with that afforded by the Sixth Amendment in federal criminal cases. Justices Frankfurter and White took no part in the decision.
Right to Counsel-People v. Garcia, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 856 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Defendant was
convicted of burglary. On appeal, defendant
contended that he was f6rced to go to trial without benefit of counsel. The District Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that where defendant made it
clear that he was unwilling to proceed without
counsel and did not feel competent to defend
himself, had unsuccessfully attempted to hire
counsel the day of the trial (before which time
having been financially unable to do so), and by
his conduct negated any inference of waiver of his
right to be represented by counsel, the trial court
should not have proceeded without appointing
counsel for defendant.
Right to Counsel-Yopps v. State, 178 A.2d
879 (Md. 1962). Defendant waived his right to
trial by jury and was convicted of burglary by the
trial court. On appeal, defendant contended that
the trial court's failure to permit defense counsel
to present a closing argument constituted prejudicial error. Noting that the case was one of
first impression in the state, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland reversed and remanded, holding that
defendant's constitutional right to be heard by
counsel necessarily included his right to have his
counsel make a dosing argument; that this right
applied to criminal cases tried by a judge sitting
without a jury as well as to those tried by a
jury; and since the trial court's ruling prevented
defendant from being effectively represented by
counsel and deprived him of his right to subject all
the facts and evidence produced at the trial to a
logical analysis, his conviction must be reversed.
Search and Seizure-Monette v. United States,
299 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1962). Defendants were
convicted of possession of unregistered distilling
apparatus and nontax-paid whiskey. On appeal,
defendants contended that the government's
evidence was obtained by an illegal search authorized by a warrant invalid for lack of probable
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cause. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed, holding that an affidavit of a State
Beverage agent, stating the facts that he had
information that a still was being operated on
certain permises, that he had observed a car
owned by a known liquor law violator parked in
front of the premises, and that he had smelled the
odor of fermenting mash emanating from the
building, set out facts constituting probable cause
for the issuance of a valid search warrant; and
consequently the search was lawful and defendants' motion to suppress was properly denied.
Search and Seizure--United States v. Paroutian,
299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962). Defendant was
convicted of violations of the narcotics laws. On
appeal from the District Court's denial of his
pre-trial motion to suppress, defendant contended
that the evidence was obtained through information discovered during an unlawful search of his
apartment. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that where
Narcotics Bureau agents, during an unlawful
warrantless search of premises on which defendant
had a right to be, discovered information which
apparently led to the seizure of heroin in a secret
compartment in the walls of a cedar closet during
a subsequent lawful warrantless search of the
same premises, with the landlord's consent, after
defendant was out of possession, the ultimate
seizure was prima fade tainted by the illegality of
the first search; that the seizure would be lawful
and the heroin admissible only if the government
had shown that its knowledge of the secret compartment came from a source other than the illegal
search; and that absent such showing, failure to
suppress the evidence was prejudicial error.
Search and Seizure-United States v. Alexander,
202 F. Supp. 209 (D. Minn. 1961). On motion to
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suppress, defendants contended that their Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when
obscene films were seized by FBI agents under
authority of an illegal search warrant. The District
Court granted the motion, holding that where on
the basis of an affidavit of an FBI agent the
search warrant, containing no statement whatsoever concerning the premises to be searched, was
issued with the understanding that upon discovery
of the location, the agent would notify the Commissioner, who in turn would authorize issuance
of the warrant with insertion of the address of the
premises, and where four days later a second FBI
agent notified the Commissioner of the address by
telephone and was authorized by him to complete
the warrant, the warrant was invalid for lack of
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation as
to the place to be searched; and consequently the
evidence seized under authority of the illegal warrant must be suppressed.
Search and Seizure-United States v. Sims,
202 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). Defendant
moved to suppress whiskey seized from him by
agents of the Alcohol Tax Unit, contending that
the search warrant under which the whiskey was
seized was illegal because the information used as
a basis for the issuance of the warrant was gained
as the result of a civil trespass on defendant's
farm. The District Court denied the motion,
holding that where federal agents standing in a
field owned by defendant observed his illegal
activities within his curtilage through binoculars,
their observations were properly used as a basis
for issuing a valid search warrant, since observations of premises protected by the Fourth Amendment made from a point outside its protection do
not violate it, and the Fourth Amendment protected only defendant's curtilage and not his
fields, even though the fields were fenced.
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